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Article

Historical aspect of Turkey's multi-vector regional policy (Central Asia)

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ABSTRACT

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Turkey is seeking to enhance its influence within the Turkic world, which Russia views as a zone of its interests and China is rapidly entering it. This move by Turkey gives rise to concerns on the part of Russia and China. However, contradictory interests and geopolitical developments in the region render Turkey more prominent on the global stage. In particular, the geopolitical struggle for spheres of influence between the United States, Russia and China has created opportunities for Turkey, which enhances its stature on the international stage. As a full member of the Organization of Turkic States, along with neighboring countries such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and with Turkmenistan and Hungary as observers, Turkey's importance within the organization is further reinforced, particularly in Central Asia. In this context, this article focuses on the position of Turkey, which is rapidly integrating in the Turkic world, enabling it to confront the interests of Russia and China. Based on specific analyses and agreements reached within the Organization of Turkic States, as well as the results of integration processes, the article attempts to explore the role of the 'Central Corridor' as an alternative to the transcontinental trade route.

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Introduction

Turkey, the second largest army in NATO, is consistently involved in strategic matters, particularly with its immediate neighbours, including the countries of the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as those bordering the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Turkey is the first country since the conclusion of the Cold War to acknowledge the sovereignty of the member states of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS). At the outset, Turkey's foreign policy strategy is predicated on the role of a model state and leader for the Turkic world (Schnitzer, 2017: 12). He sought to diminish Russia's sway in the region, thereby facilitating a more congenial integration platform with the Turkic states. In subsequent phases, particularly following the ascendance of Russia's Vladimir Putin, Turkey has adopted a more temperate and balanced approach to regional affairs.

In response, Russia and China have begun to adopt individual positions within the international system and to view the political development of countries that have followed the United States as a threat. China has made numerous statements in support of Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine, while also publicly maintaining its neutrality. Iran, as a long-isolated country, observed Russia's necessity for military equipment, both at the outset of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and subsequently. It began to offer support, while the United States was actively attempting to avoid involvement (Smagin, 2022). Furthermore, the presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan has resulted in a precarious political equilibrium in Central Asia, compelling major powers to reassess their regional policies. It is beyond dispute that Afghanistan represents a significant security risk for Central Asia. In this context, this article examines the geopolitical situation of Turkey and the Turkish states of Central Asia in the context of global and regional geopolitical struggles. The OTS will examine the extent of Turkey's capacity to engage in collaborative endeavours and its potential to act as a competitive state in relation to Russia and China.

Due to the geopolitical competition between Russia and China, the recent deepening and development of Turkey's relations with The Central Asian countries has attracted the attention of the world. Turkey, which is increasingly heading for Central Asia, is strengthening its economic, political and military ties with the Turkic states, which, in turn, highlights the relevance of the topic being studied. Turkey has also positioned itself as an «alternative force» that holds the balance of influence between Russia, China and Iran. To date, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are full members of the OTS, and Turkmenistan and Hungary are observer states. It is evident that Turkey's strategic policy and importance in the region will undoubtedly be further enhanced by the OTS's location from Europe to China (Plotnikov, 2016: 160-177).

However, they do attempt to influence each other's internal politics. Nevertheless, it is believed that Turkey's strategic objectives and interest in the Turkic world will be sufficient to counterbalance these actions.

Materials and methods

Analyzing the current side of the study, the article used methods of empirical analysis that studied various factors, aspects and directions of Turkish foreign policy, which is rapidly integrating into the Turkic world, opposing the interests of Russia and China. These data were obtained from official sources such as national statistical agencies and international organizations. In addition, in order to assess the influence of Turkey within the framework of geopolitical dynamics in the Turkic world, historical processes and international relations were analyzed based on theoretical approaches and concepts. This analysis looked at factors such as security, economic cooperation, cultural ties, and political influence.

Research background

During the study, a historical review was conducted, which included academic and scientific papers on the topic, domestic and foreign studies, analytical materials on regional policy, foreign policy of Turkey and geopolitical dynamics in the Turkic world. A review of the study literature analyzed the main themes and arguments used for analysis. Among them, especially the studies conducted by Turkish researchers Akpınar B.G. (Akpınar, 2022: 181-216), Akyıldız S.A. (Akyıldız, 2023) and Russia researchers Vartazarova L.S., Kobrinskaya I.Ia., Utkin S.V. (Vartazarova, Kobrinskaya, Utkin, 2019) and Schnitzer A. (Schnitzer, 2017:12), Chikhladze T. (Chikhladze, 2022: 15). Among the Turkish researchers is the scientific study of Erkin Ekrem, which comprehensively covers China's strategic goals in Central Asia (Ekrem, 2011: 23-38). The political documents were subjected to analysis with a view to establishing a systematic overview of the issue and determining the principal objectives of the actors in the region. Official declarations, documents, agreements and statements defining Turkey's regional policy towards Russia and China were analyzed. This allowed us to gain insight into Turkey's position and its strategic interests in the region.

Analysis

Turkey having historical, linguistic, religious and cultural ties and similarities with the countries of the region, due to the new Erdogan's foreign policy and a more active role in international relations, becomes a new participant in the "great game". In this regard, when analyzing Turkey's foreign policy in Central Asia, we should consider this issue at two levels, namely: at the bilateral and regional levels. Turkey's efforts come alongside efforts to revive Turkey's economy, which is deteriorating ahead of historic elections in May 2023. In addition to these reasons, Turkey's renewed interest in the region highlights its post-Cold War strategic aspirations to position itself as a logistics and energy hub linking Europe and Asia. However, with geopolitical tensions and competition heating up, there are doubts in Europe about Turkey's strategic orientation. Therefore, it is necessary to scientifically assess Turkey's position in the emerging Eurasian space, the positive and negative aspects of interaction with it.

Turkey's official institutions have identified the shifting of the centre of economic severity in international relations to Asia. This is a consequence of the weakening of American dominance and the rise of China to an increasingly powerful economic and strategic ally, as well as Russia's destructive actions. In particular, Russia is seeking to increase its influence in Central Asia by demonstrating its policies in the region or by broadcasting unedited propaganda on television, exploiting human resources, creating challenges with regard to domestic energy and food production. Based on this forecast and Turkey's intention to leverage its close historical, cultural and religious ties with Turkic states as a foreign policy advantage in the post-Cold War era, Turkey announced in August 2019 an 'Initiative to Modernise the Common Turkic World'. (Sabri, 2000: 169-182).

With the conclusion of the two rounds of elections, R.T. Erdogan has secured a five-year term as leader of Turkey. This will undoubtedly allow the country to intensify its efforts to advance its 'pragmatic transition' in global affairs. In this case, Turkey will try to persuade China to use the Central Corridor in the «One Belt - One Road» initiative. It is aimed at establishing Turkey as a hub for logistics and energy center between Europe and Asia. The renewed interest in Central Asia evidenced by Turkey's increased military and diplomatic involvement in the region. Many experts noted that with the support of Turkey, Azerbaijan played a decisive role in the victory over Armenia in the second Karabach war in late 2020. A year later, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu announced that he would appoint a special envoy to negotiate «stabilization» of relations with Armenia (Chikhladze, 2022: 3-15). In 2009, at the Nakhichevan meeting in Azerbaijan, the Turkic Council was established. It was re-established as the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), which reflects the efforts of «diversification and strengthening of cooperation in economy and trade.» Hungary (since 2018) and Turkmenistan (since 2021) have subsequently assumed control of the organisation. Concurrently, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is the subject of a territorial dispute and is recognised only by Turkey, was recently accorded the status of non-member observer (Schnitzer, 2017: 12). Here we must focus on the position of Turkey, which is rapidly integrating into the Turkic world, which gives it the opportunity to counter the interests of Russia and China in relation to the "Central Corridor", as an alternative to the transcontinental trade route.

Mike Doran, a researcher at the Hudson Institute in the United States, highlighted the pivotal role that Turkey plays in the Central Asian region. He identified Turkey as a potential counterbalance to the influence of Russia, China and Iran in the region, and suggested that the most effective means of separating Russia from Iran would be through Central Asia. Central Asia is home to significant fossil fuel reserves, with Turkmenistan ranking fourth in terms of gas reserves and Kazakhstan possessing substantial oil reserves. However, the lack of infrastructure to transport these resources, particularly oil, through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and beyond, presents a challenge. Additionally, Turkmenistan lacks the capacity to transport its own gas, as both countries are subject to the influence of China, Russia, and Iran. Turkey can be considered a regional power on par with Russia, China, and Iran.

The relationship between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan is characterised by a high degree of proximity. They were notably successful in the conflict with Russia over the 2021 Karabakh war, and have developed a robust and evolving military alliance. With the assistance of Turkish and Israeli weaponry, the Azerbaijanis have vanquished the Armenians. The Turkic, Israeli and Azerbaijani alliances were instrumental in the defeat of Armenian forces in the Karabakh War. This evidenced a strategic authority against Russia. It would be beneficial for the United States to consider how it might facilitate the formation of a strategic alliance between Turkey, Israel and Azerbaijan, with the aim of providing security for the transport of resources belonging to Kazakhs and Turkmens through the Central Corridor to Europe. If the Central Corridor is not implemented with the Turks, the Chinese will do so instead. This will result in a situation in which relations between the Chinese, Arabs, Iranians and the United Arab Emirates will develop (Akyıldız, 2023). Therefore, this U.S. concern is becoming increasingly pertinent in the present context.

Turkey's ruling elite is demanding a free monetary policy to stimulate economic growth. Indeed, the economy continues to expand at a slower pace and at the expense of ever-growing inflation, weak real incomes and rising income inequality. With its persistent efforts to increase trade with the Turkic world, Turkey is striving to achieve two goals at the same time. First, he wanted to give Turkish business new opportunities abroad and to retain political support in the 2023 elections. At the same time, the war has increased the Turkish leadership's desire to capitalize on the global reconstruction of the supply chain caused by the pandemic. Turkey considers its location between Europe and Asia to give the country a competitive advantage, allowing it to become a «logistics and production base» (Vartazarova, Kobrinskaya, Utkin, 2019: 15). In this regard, the sixth and ninth paragraphs of Russia's intermediary agreement, which ended the second Karabakh war at the end of 2020, bring Turkey one step closer to its strategic ambitions of becoming a center of transcontinental integration. A 1991 agreement led by the United States and Turkey, reminiscing about behind-the-scenes diplomacy, envisages Armenia returning control of the Lachin region to Azerbaijan and establishing a secure land corridor between the Nakhichevan exclave and Azerbaijan. The agreement allows Turkey access to the Caspian Sea, although it leaves the security of the Lachin region and the proposed corridor to the Russian peacekeeping forces (*Obsuzhdenie uslovii dostupa i bezopasnosti: Stsenarii koridorov i peredvizheniya v Lachine i za ego predelami*: URL).

Russia's military weakness in the war against Ukraine has further increased Turkey's renewed interest in the Turkic world. As Russia's control in the region weakened, The Turkish-supported Azerbaijani forces ended with the latest Azerbaijani-occupied entry into Armenia. Turkey's diplomatic activity in the region increased more than ever during the period of regional regrouping due to the war. In March 2022, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkey signed a declaration on the improvement of transport routes in the South Caucasus and Central Asia as an alternative to the northern route through Russia (Butyrina, 2022: 14). For the development of the trans-Caspian East-West corridor the 'Central Corridor', which connects China and Europe with Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Caspian Sea, and Central Asia via

a network of railways and transportation routes, a working group comprising representatives from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan was established. Turkey's engagement with the Turkic world extends beyond economic cooperation and logistics. As the balance of forces in the region changes and individual states seek to act autonomously, Turkey is also attempting to establish itself as an alternative security provider in the security market. For example, Turkey has developed relations with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to the extent of a strategic alliance. NATO member (Turkey) and CSTO member (Kazakhstan) agreed to expand cooperation in the field of defense and exchange of military intelligence. Furthermore, both countries have reached an agreement whereby Turkey's ANKA unmanned aircraft will be manufactured in Kazakhstan. (Turtsiya i Kazakhstan podpisali soglashenie o sovместnom proizvodstve udarnyh bespilotnikov: URL).

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, there are more than 4,000 Turkish companies operating in the Central Asian region. In Kazakhstan, a considerable number of Turkish companies are engaged in the provision of services across a range of sectors, including food, construction, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and manufacturing. Turkish construction companies have invested approximately \$21 billion in Kazakhstan alone. As a consequence, Turkey has become one of the largest investors in Kazakhstan. In 2019, the volume of trade between Turkey and the Turkic states of Central Asia reached 6.6 billion dollars, declining to 6.2 billion dollars in 2020. Furthermore, a considerable number of immigrants from Turkic states in Central Asia reside in Turkey. In 2021, the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) reported that there were over 90,000 Turkic peoples approximately 35,000 Uzbeks, over 20,000 Kazakhs, and 18,000 Kyrgyz residing in Turkey. On the other hand, about 20,000 Turkish citizens live in Kazakhstan, 10,000 in Kyrgyzstan, 2,000 in Uzbekistan, and 3,500 in Turkmenistan. Between 2018 and 2019, over one million Turks from Central Asia came to Turkey (Akpınar, 2022: 181-216).

Thus, the geoeconomic dimension of Turkey's foreign policy towards the Turkic world is of great importance. The issues of developing new markets in the region, ensuring the security of energy resources, attracting foreign investors, as well as geopolitics and security policy will ultimately assume greater significance. Turkey's foreign policy, especially in Central Asia, is primarily aimed at balancing the influence of regional and great powers, combating security risks, strengthening Turkey's status as a regional power and ensuring its inclusion in world politics.

Results

Turkey is further ahead of China's policy, contributing to the economic and political development of the OTS member states. Nevertheless, Russia does not intend to alienate the Turkic states of Central Asia, but rather intends to use close economic ties with Turkey to control the region (Bagdat Musin, Artur van Diesen i Dorin Bogdan-Martin podpisali Memorandum o vzaimoponimanii po sovместnoi realizatsii initsiativy GIGA: URL). Russia's

preference is for China and Turkey to refrain from intervening in Central Asia. However, given that the Turkic states of Central Asia are now independent countries with a chosen course of development, they are not subject to any restrictions on their foreign relations. Furthermore, the implementation of large-scale plans for the region will require significant financial investment, with China playing a pivotal role in this regard.

China's growing influence in the region will not only diminish Russia's global standing but also render it reliant on China, which has made significant investments in the region. The situation in Turkey is distinct from that of the other countries in the region. Turkey's foreign policy is characterized by a 'soft power' approach, which is based on national roots and foreign policy in the region. This process could potentially evolve into a political network with the objective of reducing the influence of China and Russia in the region. Furthermore, Turkey has established significant ties with Pakistan and Afghanistan, which will serve to reinforce its geopolitical and strategic positions by diversifying its regional relations. It is reasonable to posit that Turkey can further consolidate its position in Central Asia through these two countries, particularly by improving its relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan (Mushtaq, 2004: 89-116).

Turkey adheres to a balanced policy on its economic and political platforms in Central Asia and conducts its current policy in accordance with the interests of the CIS member states. In this regard, Turkey employs a range of instruments to expand its influence in the region. The pragmatic and constructive stance that Turkey has adopted towards the region is likely to reinforce its position.

Turkey is developing economic relations with the Turkic states in Central Asia. From 2005 to 2020, Turkey's exports to Kazakhstan increased from 460 million dollars to 979 million dollars, to Kyrgyzstan from 90 million dollars to 416 million dollars, and to Uzbekistan from 151 million dollars to 1.15 billion dollars. In 2020, Turkey exported a total of 3.5 billion dollars' worth of goods to the Central Asian countries. Imports from Central Asian countries reached 2.7 billion dollars. In addition to the robust economic relations with Azerbaijan, the two countries are interested in increasing the trade turnover to 15 billion dollars by 2023 (DEIK). Currently, it appears that Turkey's primary objective is to secure a stable market and a reliable system of power within the Turkic states in Central Asia. Despite the fact that the country's authorities reduced gas prices within 24 hours and returned them to their previous levels, the protests, which began in early January 2022 following an increase in gas prices in Kazakhstan have intensified into a violent conflict. In Kazakhstan, dozens of buildings and institutions were plundered and destroyed. The damage to the country amounted to two or three billion dollars (Lillis, 2022). President K-J.K. Tokayev was forced to apply to the CSTO. As a result, peacekeeping operations were organized, and CSTO forces in Kazakhstan put important state buildings under guard. With the support of the CSTO, K-J.K. Tokayev informed the world that the country has established order. Many Western media have praised the peacekeeping operation as «Russian interference in the internal affairs of the Kazakhs» (Vzglyad iz-za bugra: krovavaya turbulentnost Kazakhstana mozhet zatronut vsyu Srednuyu Aziyu, 2022: URL).

After mass protests in major cities of Kazakhstan, recognized as an example of political stability among the Turkic states in Central Asia, it was determined that the republic has moved closer to Russia than ever before. Nevertheless, when the protests shocked the country, the Russian-led CSTO made its position clear by sending troops to support Kazakhstan's leadership. Kazakhstan has become the last generation of the Eurasian and Russian geopolitical development. The events in our country will undoubtedly be of great interest to Turkey and Central Asian countries. Although Kazakhstan is a member of many Russian organizations, Turkey has similarly close ties, therefore, the Republic of Kazakhstan has not lost its regional and global importance. Furthermore, it is estimated that Kazakhstan's proximity to Russia will enhance its geopolitical credibility on the global stage (Kazakhstan: ispytanie «tranzitom vlasti»: URL). In recent years, Turkey has been building mosques, universities and secondary education institutions in Kazakhstan, implementing research projects, and in the economic sphere it is constantly increasing its investments. We believe that Turkey has a long-established and influential role in Kazakhstan. Therefore, Russia is concerned that Turkey's growing influence in the region will result in a decline in its status.

Turkey continues its «soft power» policy in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and in this regard, it is ready to move in this direction with the European countries. For example, in July 2022, the European Union and Azerbaijan signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a strategic energy partnership in order to reduce the EU's dependence on Russian gas. Similarly, the initial impact of the pandemic and the subsequent Russian-Ukrainian conflict prompted the European Union to reassess its logistics strategies, with the objective of circumventing Russian transit routes. For example, in May of this year, the Danish ship company Maersk proposed a new sea-sea route connecting Asia and Europe through the Central Corridor linking the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The European Union has become more active in the field of security. After the meeting of the two presidents N. Pashinyan and I. Aliyev on the sidelines of the first summit of the European political community, both countries agreed to place an EU citizenship mission on their border. Despite ongoing disagreements, particularly on matters of foreign policy and security, the current circumstances have given rise to a theoretical basis for closer collaboration between Turkey and the European Union (Kunakov, 2016: 123).

Turkey has been pursuing membership in the European Union for a number of years, and it is evident that this remains a stated objective. Conversely, it articulated a desire for enhanced collaboration with the European Union on the global stage. Nevertheless, the member states of the European Union have expressed reservations regarding the strategic intentions and direction of Turkey. In the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Turkey's primary considerations are its economic and security interests. It is also important to recall that Ukraine represents an important market for Turkish drones. In early October 2022, Turkey launched the first corvette for Ukraine, which resulted in Turkey becoming the largest foreign investor in Ukraine. Furthermore, in early February of that year, the two countries signed a free trade agreement (Ukraine and Turkey signed an agreement on free trade: URL).

At the same time, Russia represents one of Turkey's most significant trading partners with regard to imports, and is a principal supplier of natural gas. Tourism from Ukraine and Russia is an important source of income for the Turkish economy. The trade in wheat with both countries is about 80% of Turkish imports. Turkey is cautious about reining in Russia as it continues to provide military support to Ukraine. It keeps the strait closed to warships of any country bordering or not bordering the Black Sea. At the same time, Turkish airspace remains open to Russia. Thus, Turkey did not join the EU sanctions regime. From January to August 2022, the volume of authorized capital registered in Turkey and the number of foreign companies with Russian capital increased fourfold compared to the previous year. Moreover, there are concerns in Europe and the US that Turkey may assist Russia circumvent sanctions (Rossiyane uchredili s nachala goda v Turtsii svyshe 700 kompanii: URL). At the same time, Turkey has repeatedly stated its commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and has accused Russia of its annexation of four regions of Ukraine. Turkey has kept its diplomatic 'doors' open, testing the international order and its institutions. For example, Turkish diplomacy is aimed at restoring the grain agreement. This transaction allowed to export grain to Ukraine by sea, while Russia also benefited from this transaction due to favorable conditions (Tanis, 2022).

As part of this, Turkey's public opposition to Finland and Sweden's intentions to join NATO and the West's accusations of Russian provocation have highlighted Turkey's growing international standing. The recent increase in meetings between R.T. Erdogan and V.V. Putin and Turkey's stated intention to become a member of the SCO, doubts about the sovereignty of the Islands of Greece and the eventual granting of observer status to the OTS to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus also show Turkey's increased role in the international arena (Ildem, 2022). Despite this, R.T. Erdogan was among forty-four leaders invited to the first meeting of the European political community in Prague on October 6-7, 2022. Nevertheless, its participation does not mean that the EU considers Turkey as a strategic partner at a time when Russia's war on Ukraine radically changes the parameters of the European security order towards a protracted conflict with Russia (Erdoğan meets with leaders..., 2022: URL).

The future of ties between the EU and Turkey is uncertain, and it remains mutually predictable. The relationship between the two continents will be characterised by a lack of connection and a continued status as reliable partners, benefiting both parties. Such geopolitical discord would result in significant losses for Turkey, while the 'Central Corridor' initiative would lead to increased activity between the two continents, namely Central Asian countries and the European Union. Consequently, Turkey may be able to offset the growing influence of Russia and China in Central Asia. However, it is anticipated that numerous projects traversing Central Asia will be negotiated between Turkey, the EU, Russia, and China, and that the Eurasian region will undergo a process of reconstruction in the context of such uncertainty. Turkey's position within this evolving space will be shaped not only by its own actions, but also by the actions of the EU and its member states.

Conclusion

In recent years, the deepening and development of Turkey's relations with the Turkic world has been subject to close monitoring due to the geopolitical rivalry between China and Russia. Turkey maintains a balanced approach in its economic and political dealings with Central Asia, pursuing initiatives in alignment with its own interests and those of the broader region. Turkey employs a range of instruments to extend its influence in the Turkic states of Central Asia. Adopting a pragmatic and constructive approach to the region will enable Turkey to consolidate its position. Turkey's strategic move to Central Asia and multilateral cooperation with the Turkic states are based on pragmatic, economic and geostrategic motives. Turkey is interested in gaining greater autonomy from the West, expanding its regional influence and creating a balance against regional powers, Russia and China. In general, Turkey is in a position to become an even more important actor in regional and global politics in the new global era.

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Түркияның көпвекторлы аймақтық саясатының тарихи аспектісі (Орталық Азия)

Аннотация. Ресей мен Қытайдың жаһандық және аймақтық саясаттағы геосаяси ықпалының көрінісі Ресейге қарсы жаһандық санкцияларға байланысты Орталық Азияның түркі мемлекеттерінде ерекше байқалады. Осы уақыт ішінде Ресей мен Қытайдың геосаяси ықпалының

әсерінен Түркия мен аймақ елдері арасындағы қарым-қатынастарды тереңдету және дамыту үдерісі бұрынғыдан да өзекті бола түсті. Түркия, Ресей дәстүрлі түрде өз мүдделерінің аймағы деп санайтын түркі әлемінде ықпалдырақ болуға ұмтылады, Қытай болса осы жүйенің ішіне енуде. Түркияның бұл ұстанымы, әрине, Ресей мен Қытайды алаңдатады. Дегенмен, аймақтағы қайшы мүдделер мен геосаяси оқиғалар шеңберіндегі Түркияның іс-әрекеттері жылдам түрде көзге түсуде. Атап айтқанда, АҚШ, Ресей және Қытайдың ықпал ету аймақтары үшін геосаяси күресі Түркия үшін қолайлы мүмкіндіктер туғызып, оның халықаралық деңгейде беделін арттыруда. Түркия, Қазақстан, Әзербайжан, Өзбекстан және Қырғызстан толық мүшелер, ал Түрікменстан мен Мажарстан Түркі мемлекеттері ұйымына (ТМҰ) бақылаушы елдер болғандықтан, бұл Түркияның ТМҰ жүйесінде, әсіресе Орталық Азиядағы маңыздылығын одан әрі арттыруда. Осы тұрғыда, бұл мақала түркі әлеміне жылдам интеграцияланып жатқан Түркияның Ресей мен Қытай мүдделеріне қарсы тұруға мүмкіндік беретін ұстанымдарын зерттеуге арналған. Нақты аналитикалық деректер мен ТМҰ шеңберінде қол жеткізілген келісімдерге, сондай-ақ интеграциялық үдерістердің нәтижелеріне негізделе отырып, мазмұнды талдау мен салыстырмалы эмпирикалық тәсілді қолдану арқылы мақалада «Орталық дәліздің» рөлі мен трансконтиненталдық сауда жолының балама ретіндегі қызметін зерттеуге талпыныс жасалады.

Кілт сөздер: Түркия, түркі әлемі, тепе-теңдік, Ресей, Қытай, Еуропалық Одақ, «Орталық дәліз», геосаясат, интеграция.

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Исторический аспект многовекторной региональной политики Турции (Центральная Азия)

Аннотация. Отражение геополитического влияния России и Китая в глобальной и региональной политике наиболее ощутимо в тюркских государствах Центральной Азии из-за мировых санкций против России. За это время процесс углубления и развития отношений Турции со странами региона под влиянием геополитического воздействия России и Китая еще более актуализировался. Турция стремится быть более влиятельной в тюркском мире, который Россия традиционно рассматривает как зону своих интересов, а Китай стремительно туда

входит. Эта позиция Турции, естественно, беспокоит Россию и Китай. Однако противоречивые интересы и геополитические события в регионе делают Турцию более заметной. В частности, геополитическая борьба за сферы влияния США, России и Китая создают благоприятные возможности для Турции, что повышает ее авторитет на международном уровне. Поскольку Турция, Казахстан, Азербайджан, Узбекистан и Кыргызстан являются полноправными членами, а Туркменистан и Венгрия странами-наблюдателями Организации тюркских государств (ОТГ), это еще больше повышает значимость Турции в системе ОТГ, особенно Центральной Азии. В данном контексте статья посвящена исследованию позиций Турции, которая стремительно интегрирует в тюркском мире, что дает ей возможность противостоять интересам России и Китая. На основе конкретных аналитических данных и достигнутых договоренностей в рамках ОТГ, а также результатов интеграционных процессов путем применения контент-анализа и сравнительно-эмпирического подхода в статье делается попытка изучения роли «Центрального коридора» как альтернативы трансконтинентального торгового пути.

Ключевые слова: Турция, тюркский мир, противостояние, Россия, Китай, Европейский союз, «Центральный коридор», геополитика, интеграция.

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